What is the significance of u 2 incident

Upon examination by experts of all data at the disposal of the Soviet side, it was incontrovertibly established that the intruder aircraft belonged to the United States of America, was permanently based in Turkey and was sent through Pakistan into the Soviet Union with hostile purposes.

As Chairman of the U. Council of Ministers N. Khrushchev made public on May 7 at the final session of the U. Supreme Soviet, exact data from the investigation leave no doubts with respect to the purpose of the flight of the American aircraft which violated the U.

This aircraft was specially equipped for reconnaissance and diversionary flight over the territory of the Soviet Union. It had on board apparatus for aerial photography for detecting the Soviet radar network and other special radio-technical equipment which form part of U. At the disposal of the Soviet expert commission which carried out the investigation, there is indisputable proof of the espionage reconnaissance mission of the American aircraft: films of Soviet defense and industrial establishments, a tape recording of signals of Soviet radar stations and other data.

Pilot Powers, about whose fate the Embassy of the United States of America inquired in its note of May 6, is alive and, as indicated in the aforementioned speech of Chairman of the U.

Khrushchev, will be brought to account under the laws of the Soviet state. The pilot has indicated that he did everything in full accordance with the assignment given him. On the flight map taken from him there was clearly and accurately marked the entire route he was assigned after take-off from the city of Adana Turkey : Peshwar Pakistan — the Ural Sea — Sverdlovsk — Archangel — Murmansk, followed by a landing at the Norwegian airfield at Bude. The pilot also stated that he served in subunit number which under cover of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration is engaged in high altitude military reconnaissance.

This and other information revealed in speeches of the head of the Soviet Government completely refuted the U. State Department's concocted and hurriedly fabricated version, released May 5 in the official announcement for the press, to the effect that the aircraft was allegedly carrying out meteorological observations in the upper strata of the atmosphere along the Turkish-Soviet border. After the complete absurdity of the aforementioned version had been shown and it had been incontrovertibly proven that the American aircraft intruded across the borders of the Soviet Union for aggressive reconnaissance purposes, a new announcement was made by the U.

State Department on May 7 which contained the forced admission that the aircraft was sent into the Soviet Union for military reconnaissance and, by the very fact, it was admitted that the flight was pursuing aggressive purposes.

In this way, after two days, the State Department already had to deny the version which obviously had been intended to mislead world public opinion as well as American public opinion itself. The State Department considered it appropriate to refer in its announcement to the "open skies" proposal made by the Government of the United States of America in and to the refusal of the Soviet Government to accept this proposal. Yes, the Soviet Government, like the governments of many other states, refused to accept this proposal which was intended to throw open the doors of other nations to American reconnaissance.

The activities of American aviation only confirm the correctness of the evaluation given to this proposal at the time by the Soviet Government. Does this not mean that, with the refusal of a number of states to accept this proposal for "open skies," the United States of America is attempting arbitrarily to take upon itself the right "to open" a foreign sky? It is enough to put the question this way, for the complete groundlessness of the aforementioned reference to the United States of America "open skies" proposal to become clear.

It follows from the aforementioned May 7 announcement of the U. State Department that the hostile acts of American aviation, which have taken place numerous times in relation to the Soviet Union, are not simply the result of activity of military commands of the United States of America in various areas but are the expression of a calculated U.

That which the Soviet Government has repeatedly declared in its representations to the Government of the United States of America in connection with the violations of U. All this testifies that the Government of the United States of America, instead of taking measures to stop such actions by American aviation, the danger of which has more than once been pointed out by the Soviet Government, officially announces such action as its national policy.

Thus, the Government of the United States of America, in the first place, testifies to the fact that it answers to representations of the Soviet Government were only for the sake of form, behind which were concealed an effort to avoid the substance of the issue, and that all violations by American aircraft of the national boundaries of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics represented acting conforming to U.

In the second place, and this is the main point, by sanctioning such actions of American aviation, the Government of the United States of America aggravates the situation even more. One must ask, how is it possible to reconcile this with declarations on the part of leading figures of the United States of America, that the Government of the United States of America, like the Soviet Government, also strives for improvement of relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, for relaxation of international tension, and strengthening of trust between states.

Military intelligence activities of one nation by means of intrusion of its aircraft into the area of another country can hardly be called a method for improving relations and strengthening trust.

It is self-evident that the Soviet Government is compelled, under such circumstances, to give strict orders to its armed forces to take all necessary measures against violation of Soviet boundaries by foreign aviation. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics regretfully states that, while it undertakes everything possible for normalization and improvement of the international situation, the Government of the United States of America follows a different path.

It is impossible to exclude the thought that, apparently the two Governments view differently the necessity for improving relations between our countries and for creation of a favorable ground for the success of the forthcoming summit meeting. The Soviet Government, as well as all of the Soviet people, considered that the personal meetings and discussions with the President of the United States of America and other American official figures which the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Rep7ublics had during his visit to the United States of America, made a good beginning in the cause of normalizing Soviet-American relations and therefore the improvement of the entire international situation as well.

However, the latest actions of American authorities apparently seek to return the state of American-Soviet relations to the worst times of the "cold war" and to poison the international situation before the summit meetings.

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics cannot avoid pointing out that the State Department's statement, which is unprecedented in its cynicism, not only justifies provocative flights of aircraft of the armed forces of the United States of America but also acknowledges that such actions are "a normal phenomenon" and thus in fact states that in the future the United States intends to continue provocative invasions into the confines of the airspace of the Soviet Union for the purpose of intelligence.

Thus the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concludes that the announcement of the State Department that the flight was carried out without the knowledge and permission of the Government of the United States of America does not correspond to reality, since in the very same announcement the necessity for carrying on intelligence activities against the Soviet Union is justified. This means that espionage activities of American aircraft are carried on with the sanction of the Government of the United States of America.

The Government of the Soviet Union makes an emphatic protest to the Government of the United States of America in connection with aggressive acts of American aviation and warns that, if similar provocations are repeated, it will be obliged to take retaliatory measures, responsibility for the consequences of which will rest on the governments of states committing aggression against other countries. The Soviet Government would sincerely like to hope that the Government of the United States of America recognizes in the final analysis that the interests of preserving and strengthening peace among peoples including the interests of the American people itself, whose striving for peace was well demonstrated during the visit of the head of the Soviet Government, N.

Khrushchev, to the United States of America, would be served by cessation of the aforementioned dangerous provocative activities with regard to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, by cessation of the "cold war," and by a search through of joint efforts with the Soviet Union and with other interested states for solution of unsettled international problems, on a mutually acceptable basis, which is awaited by all peoples.

News Conference Statement by the President, May 11, I have made some notes from which I want to talk to you about this U-2 incident. A full statement about this matter has been made by the State Department, and there have been several statesmanlike remarks by leaders of both parties.

For my part, I supplement what the Secretary of State has had to say with the following four main points. After that I shall have nothing further to say --for the simple reason that I can think of nothing to add that might be useful at this time. For text of the President's statement as well as subsequent questions from the press, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D.

Eisenhower, - 61, pages - Eisenhower's decision on May 12 to call off all activities that the Soviets might regard as provocative is summarized in Document Eisenhower left by plane for the summit conference on May Soon after his arrival in Paris on May 15, he learned that Khrushchev had read to Prime Minister Harold Macmillan a message a copy was given to President Charles de Gaulle demanding that Eisenhower denounce the U - 2 flights over the Soviet Union as provocative, renounce further flights, and "pass severe judgment" on those responsible for them as conditions for his participation at the summit conference.

He reiterated these demands at the conference opening session the following morning. Eisenhower asserted that overflights of the Soviet Union had been suspended for the duration of his administration, but when he refused to apologize, Khrushchev withdrew his invitation to Eisenhower to visit the Soviet Union and also withdrew from the summit.

For the record of this session, see volume IX, Document Security Council to consider the question of "aggressive acts by the United States Air Force against the Soviet Union, creating a threat to universal peace. For texts of the statements made in the Security Council by Representative Henry Cabot Lodge on May 23, 26, and 27, as well as texts of the Soviet draft resolution and a revised version of a resolution introduced by Argentina, Ceylon, Ecuador, and Tunisia, see Department of State Bulletin, June 13, , pages - The four-power resolution is also printed in Documents on Disarmament, , pages 96 - The Security Council rejected the Soviet draft resolution on May 26 by seven votes to two Poland and the Soviet Union with two abstentions Ceylon and Tunisia and approved the four-power resolution the following day by a vote of nine to zero, with Poland and the Soviet Union abstaining.

The Soviet complaint and debate in the Security Council are summarized in Yearbook of the United Nations, , pages 40 - The President held a breakfast meeting with bipartisan congressional leaders on May 26; see Document Documentation on hearings conducted in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on events relating to the summit, including the U - 2 incident, is summarized in Document When the Soviet Union shot down a U.

See in particular Documents - For the Soviet announcement of criminal proceedings, indictment, composition of the court, a transcript of the trial August 17 - 19, and the verdict that sentenced Powers to 10 years of confinement, see The Trial of the U2, introduction by Harold J.

Berman Chicago: World Publishers, In a memorandum to Goodpaster, August 18, Allen W. Dulles listed all U - 2 overflights of Soviet bloc nations, [text not declassified] since the initiation of the U - 2 operations on June 20, Winging through the thin atmosphere at the edge of space, Powers was carrying out the type of top-secret mission he specialized in: flying a U-2 spy plane over the USSR to photograph military installations.

Unlike previous U-2 missions, however, this one went terribly wrong. As Powers flew over Sverdlovsk present-day Yekaterinburg, Russia , a Soviet surface-to-air missile exploded near his plane, causing it to drop to a lower altitude. A second missile scored a direct hit, and Powers and his aircraft began to plummet from the sky. The pilot managed to bail out, but when his parachute floated to earth, he was surrounded by Soviet forces. Powers landed in the center of a major diplomatic crisis.

On May 5, Khrushchev announced that the Soviet military had brought down an American spy plane, but he made no mention of capturing Powers. The Soviet leader quickly disproved that story, however, by producing a photograph of the imprisoned pilot as well as evidence recovered from the wreckage that conclusively showed it was a surveillance aircraft. The U-2 spy plane incident occurred at a crucial juncture in U. Eisenhower and Khrushchev were scheduled to join the leaders of France and Great Britain at a summit in Paris on May The American president had hoped the Paris summit would yield new agreements on nuclear arms production and testing, but he recognized that the embarrassing U-2 crisis posed a potential obstacle to that goal.

Before the world leaders opened their Paris meeting, the Eisenhower administration took responsibility for the spy flights and admitted that the weather plane explanation was false. The U-2 incident had convinced Khrushchev that he could no longer cooperate with Eisenhower, and the Soviet leader walked out of the Paris meeting just hours after it began. Soviet negotiators also abandoned talks on nuclear disarmament the following month.

Kennedy While world leaders squabbled about the spy flights, Powers remained in a Soviet prison. In August , he was put on trial for espionage, convicted and sentenced to 10 years of confinement. He ultimately spent less than two years behind bars. After returning to the U.